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THE CASE AGAINST TAX REFORM IN 1985 
by Murray L. Weidenbaum 
Presenting the case against 11 tax reform .. at first seems like making a 
case against democracy and justice. Nonetheless, there are sound and 
compelling reasons to oppose the current rush to revise the Internal Revenue 
Code. 
The Treasury's Proposals 
The staff of the Treasury Department has proposed a 11 modified flat tax, 11 
an academic economist's dream-- an ideal tax structure for the long run. 
This new system would lower income tax rates, reduce the number of brackets, 
and curtail or eliminate many of the special provisions that have been added 
to the Internal Revenue Code over the years. These changes sound so good that 
it seems difficult for anyone to quarrel with them. Yet given the serious 
effects of these proposals, a more cautious approach is warranted. 
Upon examining the specific details of the Treasury Department's tax 
reform proposals, it appears that these changes are tantamount to taking a few 
steps forward, only to end up taking even more steps backward. The following 
are four sets of these pluses and minuses: 
1. Income tax rates would be lowered. The top bracket would decline 
from 50 percent to 35 percent, but the plan would eliminate 
Note: Dr. Weidenbaum is Director of the Center for the Study of American 
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preferential treatment of capital gains, and limit the tax 
deductibility of travel and entertainment. 
2. The personal deduction would be raised to $2,000, but itemized 
deductions of charitable contributions would be limited to the amount 
over 2 percent of adjusted gross income. For those taxpayers who 
do not itemize, there would no longer be a special deduction. Also, 
the deduction of state and local taxes would be terminated. 
3. Depreciation allowances would be protected from inflation, but the 
faster write-offs authorized in 1981 would be removed altogether. 
Furthermore, the Treasury would eliminate the investment tax credit. 
4. Allowable deductions for worker and spouse IRAs would be raised to 
$2500 a year each, but deductions for mortgage interest would be 
restricted to the taxpayer's principal residence. In addition, only 
$5,000 of other personal interest payments would be tax deductible. 
Not every speci a 1 pro vision in the tax code would be e 1 imina ted or even 
modified. Six key items would not be changed at all. Under the Treasury's 
plan, the deduction for medical expenses above 5 percent of adjusted gross 
income, tax deferral of corporate pensions, taxation of Social Security 
benefits, tax exemption of public-purpose municipal bonds, indexing of 
personal income tax brackets and personal exemptions, and preferential 
treatment of capital gains on owner-occupied housing would all be retained. 
Some Initial Impacts 
In sum, these changes would reduce the overall tax burden on individuals 
and families by about 7 percent, while increasing corporate tax bills by 
approximately 30 percent . . This result may appear politically attractive, but 
in terms of elementary economics, the Treasury staff apparently ignored one of 
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President Reagan's most basic and accurate statements: business doesn't pay 
taxes; it collects them. Only people pay taxes. Moreover, these changes 
would transfer after-tax income from business firms who save and invest 
heavily to consumers with much lower saving tendencies. 
Of course, the advocates of the modified flat tax do not formally propose 
to shift the tax burden from consumption to investment. But reducing tax 
rates and offsetting the substantial revenue loss by closing .. loopholes .. will 
have this effect. Apparently, the tax reformers overlooked the fact that 
these .. loopholes .. have helped fuel the current economic expansion. The irony 
here is rich indeed; the same Treasury Department that urged Congress to enact 
the Accelerated Capital Recovery System (ACRS) as tax reform in 1981 is now 
selling the rescission of ACRS as tax reform in 1985. What is less amusing, 
hm·Jever, is that such .. reform .. is likely to reduce investment and economic 
growth, thereby increasing unemployment. 
Another problem area in the ambitious Treasury tax plan is the proposed 
treatment of small business. Eliminating .. progression .. in corporate tax 
brackets may sound like tax simplification, but for a small incorporated 
business with taxable income of $50,000 a year, the proposed 33 percent 
standard rate would double its tax bill. For a corporation with annual 
taxable income of $100,000, its federal income tax would increase 28 percent. 
Perhaps, in his review of the Treasury staff work, the new Secretary, 
James Baker, will abandon changes with such undesirable results. 
The proposal to eliminate the lower tax rate for capital gains would also 
weaken the prospects for an expanding economy. The record on this tax is 
clear. When the rate goes up, the pool of venture capital shrinks. 
Conversely, when the capital gains rate is lowered, the supply of venture 
capital grows rapidly -- and so does the economy. 
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In 1969, Congress raised the top capital gains tax rate from 25 to 49 
percent. The impact of this hike was devastating; venture capitalists 
commonly refer to the 1970s as the "Death Valley Days" of this critical 
source of funds for formative enterprises. In 1978, the rate was cut to 28 
percent and the availabflity of venture capital soared. The further cut in 
1981 reinforced this trend. The results are plain to see: the rapid creation 
of new companies and new jobs. 
It is not surprising that new high-tech companies-- which rarely start 
off with large accumulations of capital -- have been in the vanguard of 
opposition to changing the current tax treatment of capital gains. 
In an administration that has rightly advocated greater reliance on 
voluntarism and private sect~r initiatives, the Treasury proposals for a basic 
reduction in tax incentives for charitable contributions is a serious 
contradiction. Similarly, the same administration that has consistently (and 
correctly) urged a shift in federal responsibilities to the state and local 
level, is now proposing to eliminate the helpful deduction of state and local 
taxes. 
Since the average taxpayer contributes less than two percent of adjusted 
gross income to charity, the great bulk of gifts to philanthropic institutions 
would no longer be tax deductible. In addition, the proposal to eliminate the 
deductions of charitable contributions for those taxpayers who do not itemize 
would have a similar effect, since two out of three taxpayers do not itemize. 
The result would not be the end of voluntary giving. But, at the margin, 
we would expect taxpayers to make fewer gifts to many types of non-profit 
organizations. Professor Charles Clotfelter of Duke University projects that 
charitable giving would decline by 20 percent under the Treasury proposal. He 
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also estimates that contributions by high-income taxpayers would decline 
substantially, which would eventually lead to a decrease in charitable 
endowments, arguably the most valuable type of contribution. 
These items are just a sampler; it seems that the Treasury•s tax 
proposals constitute an ill-considered assortment. What is most 
disconcerting, however, is the myopic vision of the Treasury staff. When you 
ask the plan•s architects how much attention was given to the effects of their 
ambitious package on growth and investment, the response is, incredibly, that 
they have not gotten around to it yet. 
Apparently, the Treasury reformers were primarily concerned with 
designing a paragon, a peerless new tax system for the long run. Academics in 
general, and economists in particular, are often criticized for being wedded 
to idealized models and notions. This is a valid criticism of the Treasury 
staff, whose plan is nearly oblivious to so many of the practical problems 
including the arbitrary distribution of windfall gains and losses-- that 
would arise during the transition from the status quo to their new 11 ideal. 11 
The Case for Tax Loopholes 
Because most of the revenue raised under the Treasury proposal is in the 
form of closing 11 loopholes, .. some attention to the true nature of that 
pejorative term is warranted. 
Contrary to popular belief, most of these special provisions do not 
result from an ingenious accountant•s deft manipulation of the Internal 
Revenue Code•s arcane minutia. Rather, the typical loophole was deliberately 
placed there by Congress to achieve some important national objective. The 
really big revenue losses among the special provisions are items which the 
average taxpayer never thinks of as a loophole; they result from such everyday 
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activities as working and owning a home. Some of the most highly publicized 
loopholes, in contrast, involve significant but more modest revenue losses. 
Examples include tax exemption of interest on state and local bonds and 
shelters for certain types of real estate income. 
The largest 11 loophole 11 results from excluding employer-paid fringe 
ben~fits from taxable income. Simply not having to declare the value of 
company-financed pensions, health insurance, and similar benefits costs the 
federal Treasury $79 billion a year in lost revenues. Being able to deduct 
mortgage interest, and property and other state and local taxes, reduces 
federal revenues by $66 billion annually. The deductibility of charitable 
contributions and personal interest payments also results in a substantial 
revenue 1 oss. 
Other important special tax provisions provide incentives for saving and 
investment. r~1any corporate 11 loopholes 11 have been created to promote economic 
growth -- notably the investment tax credit and liberalized depreciation 
allowances. Individual investment is encouraged by lower tax rates on capital 
gains. 
Because tax reformers have ignored the justifications for many of these 
special provisions, it is appropriate to consider why these 11 loopholes 11 are 
currently in the tax code. In many instances, these tax breaks foster private 
sector alternatives in areas where the public sector would otherwise attempt 
to provide services. For example, most of the fringe benefits provided by 
employers are substitutes for direct government operation of social programs. 
Private insurance in lieu of national health insurance is perhaps the most 
obvious case in point. 
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Simi 1 arly, the incentives for home ownership are important factors in 
enhancing family and neighborhood stability. In contrast, direct federal 
involvement in housing has been a dismal failure. The deductibility of state 
and local taxes is, in effect, a basic .. revenue sharing .. effort by the federal 
government, where the shares are determined by state rather than federal 
actions. 
The special treatment of capital gains, the investment credit, and 
liberalized depreciation allowances are strongly justified by the need to 
promote investment and achieve a growing economy. Arguments for reducing 
these business .. subsidies .. would be more compelling if the Treasury were not 
competing so vigorously with the private sector for the limited supply of 
savings. Existing investment incentives enhance the ability of 
capital-intensive enterprises (agricultural and industrial) to finance capital 
formation out of internal cash flow. Thus, the tax incentives are an 
important ingredient for economic growth. 
There are many reasons for the tax deductibility of charitable 
contributions. Voluntary, private institutions provide important diversity 
and choice in a free society. They often take on responsibilities which 
otherwise would be financed entirely by government revenues. Besides being 
considerably more expensive, those alternative government-sponsored programs 
are often less effective since they tend to ignore market forces and 
individual incentives. 
From the viewpoint of determining the desirability of maintaining any 
specific tax incentive, we should compare the costs and benefits of various 
ways of achieving public policy objectives. In many cases, tax incentives are 
a more desirable and more economical alternative than direct federal outlays 
because they focus on the private sector to achieve national objectives. In 
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other cases, just letting the market work provides the most attractive 
approach. There is no need to take a doctrinaire attitude and prohibit public 
policy from using any of these alternatives. The advantages and disadvantages 
of each mechanism should be weighed, and the most desirable one used to 
achieve a specific objective, be it the encouragement of business investment 
or the discouragement of environmental pollution. 
The Intitial Business Response 
The current discussion about tax reform has succeeded in scaring business 
executives and investors all over the country. This should come as no 
surprise. A 1985 overhaul of the federal tax system would represent the 
fourth major change in five years. This will be destabilizing, especially 
since, in another year or two, we can expect a fifth tax bill to correct the 
many technical errors that will invariably result from any hastily enacted 
revision of the complicated federal tax structure. 
Under the circumstances, taxpayers should keep a few basic points in 
mind. First of all, the established tradition in federal revenue legislation 
is that the changes are not retroactive. There is no guarantee that this 
tradition will continue. But, in all likelihood, most tax law changes will be 
limited to future transactions. 
Secondly, if any tax bill is passed, it is not likely to follow the 
Treasury proposals too closely. To begin with, the President himself has not 
yet endorsed the Treasury plan and Secretary Baker is currently reviewing 
the decisions of his predecessor. In fact, a great deal of congressional 
opposition to any tax bill is developing. 
So long as pressure exists for raising ever-increasing amounts of federal 
revenue to contain the deficit, it will be difficult to introduce significant 
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improvements in the federal tax system without offsetting them through 
undesirable revenue-raising changes. 
Finally, the question of reforming the Internal Revenue Code is still in 
the stages of proposal and debate. Thus, the only thing that we can be 
absolutely sure of is that the Congress will hold many hearings and government 
printers will be cranking out numerous papers to read. 
Conclusion 
The rush to enact a fundamental change in the federal revenue system in 
1985 is misguided. First of all, in the presence of a $200 billion budget 
deficit-- which is likely to linger on through the 1980s -- prudence dictates 
that deficit reduction should get top priority. Focusing attention on tax 
reform inevitably means turning away from the more difficult, but far more 
urgent, task of reducing the overblown budget. 
A cynic might conclude that the current interest in tax reform is a 
political smokescreen whereby legislators of both parties can ignore the tough 
decisions required to get spending under control. But even for those who 
believe that the tax system is so bad that it needs to be reformed in 1985, 
there are many compelling reasons to oppose the package of Treasury Department 
staff proposals: 
1. The Treasury proposals would reduce the incentives for new 
investment. 
2. These changes would also reduce the venture capital available 
for high-tech and other formative enterprises. 
3. They would substantially raise the tax burden on small corporations. 
4.· These proposals would create uncertainty among business and private 
investors as to the future tax ground rules for new ventures. 
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5. In the aggregate, the Treasury plan would reduce economic growth and 
increase the unemployment rate. 
6. These tax changes would weaken the financial position of states and 
localities, and of private non-profit institutions. 
The best advice that can be given to the Treasury tax reformers who have 
been carried away by their enthusiasm is -- back to the drawingboard! Only 
this time, pay more attention to the effects of your proposals on the actual 
economy. 
